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I. INTRODUCTION
To look at some recent events, one might question the government’s success
or resolve in regulating hedge funds.  In 2006, for example, the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals dealt a setback to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC” or the “Commission”) concerning hedge fund regulation.  It held that the
SEC had overstepped its statutory boundaries when it adopted a rule that had
required certain hedge fund advisers to register with the Commission under the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Advisers Act”).1  Similarly, in a February
2007 report, a group of senior government officials—including Treasury Secre-
tary Henry Paulson—concluded that there was no need for further hedge fund
regulation.2
These events, however, do not reflect the realities on the ground.  The SEC
increasingly has identified hedge funds as a major priority of its enforcement and
examination programs.  Last year, for example, the Commission staff reported at
the March 2006 Practising Law Institute’s “SEC Speaks” conference that the
SEC had brought over thirty hedge fund cases in recent years.3  That same
month, at a panel at the Securities Industry Association’s Compliance & Legal
Division Seminar, SEC Enforcement Director Linda Chatman Thomsen pre-
dicted that the SEC enforcement would continue emphasizing hedge fund cases.4
Furthermore, in a March 2007 speech, she said:
We have been following the money (and there has been a lot of money
to follow to hedge funds).  We continue to see too many examples of
fraud by hedge fund managers involving the funds they manage and
investors in those funds.  These frauds run the gamut—we’ve seen
theft of assets, fraudulent valuations of securities held by the fund, and
false information provided to investors about performance and other
important matters.5
Simply put, hedge funds and issues concerning them are—and likely will re-
main—important focus areas for regulators, the SEC in particular.
1. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
2. See PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., AGREEMENT AMONG PWG AND U.S. AGENCY
PRINCIPALS ON PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES REGARDING PRIVATE POOLS OF CAPITAL (2007), availa-
ble at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/reports/hp272_principles.pdf; see also Press Release, Pres-
ident’s Working Group on Fin. Mkts., President’s Working Group on Financial Markets Releases
Common Approach to Private Pools of Capital, Guidance on Hedge Fund Issues, Focuses on Systemic
Risk, Investor Protection (Feb. 22, 2007), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp272.htm.
3. See Highlights from “SEC Speaks” 2006, SEC UPDATE (Sidley Austin LLP, New York, N.Y.) (Mar.
17, 2006).
4. See Barry W. Rashkover & Rebecca F. Ebert, SEC Enforcement in the Cox Era, 39 REV. OF SEC. &
COMMODITIES REG. 185, 198 (2006).
5. Linda Chatman Thomsen, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, SEC, Remarks Before the IA Week and the Invest-
ment Adviser Association 9th Annual IA Compliance Best Practices Summit 2007 (Mar. 22, 2007), avail-
able at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch032207lct.htm [hereinafter Remarks Before the IA
Week].
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This article surveys the landscape of SEC enforcement and examination ini-
tiatives concerning hedge funds.  Part II highlights key enforcement actions that
the SEC recently has brought against hedge funds or their personnel and actions
that otherwise involve issues related to hedge funds.  Part III looks at the exami-
nation process and discusses issues SEC examination staff are emphasizing dur-
ing their reviews of registered investment advisers.  Part IV notes certain
changes in the SEC enforcement process in general since Christopher Cox became
SEC chairman in 2005, and what those changes can mean regarding hedge
funds.
II. SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
Recent SEC enforcement actions concerning hedge funds have addressed the
impact of hedge funds on the securities markets, as well as the abuses certain
hedge fund advisers have allegedly caused their funds and investors.  In other
cases, the SEC has charged broker-dealers for allegedly facilitating or causing
hedge fund violations.
A. Basic Insider Trading Cases
Perhaps the most high-profile recent SEC enforcement actions concerning
hedge funds have involved alleged insider trading.  The Commission staff has
made a priority of insider trading generally, evident through several recent cases
involving securities industry professionals.  Many of those cases have involved
hedge funds or individuals working for them.
In SEC v. Guttenberg, for example, the Commission brought charges for
alleged illegal insider trading through two trading rings, both of which included
hedge fund tippees.6  The first trading ring began with a research analyst,
Mitchel Guttenberg of UBS Equity Research, who allegedly tipped others with
nonpublic information about upcoming analyst recommendations.7  His alleged
tippees included Erik Franklin, a trader for two hedge funds, Lyford Cay Capi-
tal, LP and Q Capital Investment Partners, LP; David Tavdy, who traded for
two broker-dealers, Andover Brokerage, LLC and Assent LLC; and Jasper Cap-
ital LLC, a day-trading firm.8  Franklin and Tavdy, in turn, allegedly tipped
others, including Mark Lenowitz, who traded for the hedge fund Chelsey Capi-
tal, and Robert Babcock, who traded for the hedge fund Lyford Cay.9  This trad-
ing ring allegedly generated an aggregate of $14 million in illegal profits.10  The
6. SEC v. Guttenberg, Litigation Release No. 20022, 2007 SEC LEXIS 383 (Mar. 1, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20022.htm.
7. Id. at *2.
8. Id. at *2–3.
9. Id.
10. Id. at *4.
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second trading ring started with a Morgan Stanley compliance lawyer, Randi
Collotta, along with her husband Christopher, who tipped others about upcoming
mergers and other transactions.11  This ring also included individuals who traded
for hedge funds, including Erik Franklin, mentioned above.12  This trading ring
allegedly received $600,000 in aggregate illegal profits.13
Guttenberg is interesting for several reasons.  First, it involves not just
civil SEC charges, but criminal charges as well.14  So far, one set of defendants,
Collotta and her husband, have pleaded guilty to criminal charges in connection
with the scheme.15  Second, the case is interesting for the lengths to which one
defendant, Guttenberg, allegedly went to avoid detection—using disposable cell
phones and coded text messages to tip the hedge fund trader, Franklin.16  Finally,
the case is interesting because although the trading allegedly yielded sizeable
profits in the aggregate, the trades alleged in the complaint actually involved
relatively modest profits, mostly four figures, when viewed individually—possi-
bly suggesting attempts by the members of the ring to fly “under the radar.”17
Earlier in 2007, the Commission staff highlighted another case as an exam-
ple of hedge fund insider trading.  In SEC v. Aragon Capital Management
LLC, the SEC’s complaint alleged that, between 2001 and 2005, Zvi Rosenthal,
a vice president at Taro Pharmaceuticals Industries, Ltd., traded on material
nonpublic information ahead of eight Taro Pharmaceuticals earnings announce-
ments and tipped others, including Zvi’s son, Amir Rosenthal, who traded in the
account of the family-owned hedge fund, Aragon Partners, LP.18
B. PIPE Cases:  Insider Trading, Fraud, and Violations of
Securities Act Section 5
The SEC has brought a handful of cases in which hedge funds have shorted
stock in advance of Private Investment in Public Equity (“PIPE”) offerings.
Some of these cases have involved insider trading and other types of fraud, while
a number have involved interesting allegations that the short sales violated Sec-
11. Id.
12. Id. at *5.
13. Id.
14. See  Press Release, U.S. Attorney S. Dist. of N.Y., UBS Executive and Former Morgan Stanley Lawyer
Among 13 Charged in Massive Insider Trading Schemes (Mar. 1, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.
gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/March07/ubsinsidertradingpr.pdf.
15. Id.
16. See Guttenberg, 2007 SEC LEXIS 383.
17. Linda Chatman Thomsen, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, SEC, Statement Concerning SEC v. Guttenberg
(Mar. 1, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch030107lct.htm.
18. SEC v. Aragon Capital Mgmt. LLC, Litigation Release No. 19995A, 2007 SEC LEXIS 295 (Feb. 13,
2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr19995a.htm.
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tion 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”)19—although, as noted
below, at least two district courts very recently rejected the Commission’s Section
5 charges in PIPEs cases.  Section 5, among other things, generally makes it
unlawful to sell a security unless a registration statement is in effect or unless
certain exemptions apply.
In a March 2006 civil action, the Commission alleged that three hedge
funds, Langley Partners, LP, North Olmsted Partners, LP, and Quantico Part-
ners, LP, and their portfolio manager, Jeffrey Thorp, engaged in a fraudulent
trading scheme to “evade the registration requirements of the federal securities
laws in connection with twenty-three unregistered securities offerings . . . [of]
‘PIPEs.’ ”20  Once they had agreed to invest in a PIPE transaction, the defen-
dants “typically sold short the issuer’s [not yet registered] stock, frequently through
‘naked’ short sales21 in Canada.”22  In so doing, the defendants violated represen-
tations to the PIPE issuers that they would not sell the PIPE stock before regis-
tration and also engaged in insider trading through the short sales, in violation of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”)  Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5.  Applying a legal theory that at least two district courts have since re-
jected, the SEC further alleged that the funds violated Section 5 of the Securities
Act because later—after the registrations for the PIPE stock became effective—
the funds used those PIPE shares to cover the short positions.23  To conceal that
conduct, the defendants allegedly employed deceptive trading techniques, includ-
ing wash sales and matched orders, to create the appearance that they were cov-
ering the short positions with open market purchases, not the newly registered
PIPE stock.24  Among other remedies, the hedge funds consented to disgorge $8.8
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78e (2000).
20. SEC v. Langley Partners, LP, Litigation Release No. 19607, 2006 SEC LEXIS 594 (Mar. 14, 2006),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19607.htm.
21. SEC, NAKED SHORT SALES (2007), http://www.sec.gov/answers/nakedshortsale.htm (“In a ‘naked’ short
sale, the seller does not borrow or arrange to borrow the securities in time to make delivery to the buyer
within the standard three-day settlement period.  As a result, the seller fails to deliver securities to the
buyer when delivery is due; this is known as a ‘failure to deliver’ or ‘fail.’ ”).
22. See Langley Partners, 2006 SEC LEXIS 594.
23. Id. This Section 5 theory effectively deems the defendant to have shorted the PIPE stock before it was
registered because, post-registration, the defendants use that PIPE stock to cover the shorts.  Rejecting that
theory to date are SEC v. Lyon, No. 06 Civ. 14338, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9, at *27, *30 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
2, 2008) (“. . . from the Court’s perspective, a short sale of a security constitutes a sale of that security.
How an investor subsequently chooses to satisfy the corresponding deficit in his trading account does not
alter the nature of that sale. . . .  Thus, no interest in the PIPE shares is alleged to have been transferred
prior to the effective dates of the relevant resale registration statements. . .”) and Transcript of Hearing at
44, SEC v. Mangan, No. 06-CV-531 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 24, 2007) (“. . .what we have here. . .is a post hoc
ergo propter hoc argument by the government that because the PIPE in fact was not registered and
because the PIPE shares were later in fact used, he in effect sold the PIPE.  Well, maybe, but I don’t think
he did anything illegal.  In short, no sale of unregistered securities occurred as a matter of law.”).
24. Langley Partners, 2006 SEC LEXIS 594.
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million in illegal profits, and the hedge funds and Thorp agreed to pay civil
penalties totaling $7 million.25
In January 2007, the SEC filed an action involving similar facts against
Joseph J. Spiegel, “a former portfolio manager for Spinner Global Technology
Fund, Ltd. (“SGTF”), a New York-based hedge fund.”26  The SEC alleged that
Spiegel violated the antifraud and registration provisions of the federal securities
laws by engaging in naked short selling in Canada in advance of three PIPE
offerings and later covering those short positions with the PIPE stock once it
became freely tradable.27  Spiegel’s naked short selling, which came after defen-
dants learned about the PIPE offerings, allegedly violated representations SGTF
made to the PIPE issuers that SGTF would not sell the PIPE stock before that
stock’s registration became effective.28  Later, “Spiegel employed wash sales and
matched orders to make it appear that he was covering SGTF’s pre-effective date
short positions with open market stock purchases,” rather than with the newly
registered PIPE stock.29  Spiegel consented to the entry of an injunction and a
$110,000 civil penalty.30  He also agreed to the issuance of an administrative
order “barring him from association with an investment adviser, with a right to
reapply in three years.”31
In 2005, the Commission filed a civil action and an administrative proceed-
ing against Hilary Shane for alleged insider trading and unregistered sales of
securities in connection with a PIPE offering.32  Shane, an investment adviser
for a broker-dealer, primarily managed the portfolios of, and provided invest-
ment advice to, certain hedge funds.33  In 2001, she elected to participate in a
PIPE offering by CompuDyne, a Maryland-based safety and security company,
for both her personal account and that of a hedge fund she managed.34  After
executing the purchase agreement, including a confidentiality provision, she pro-
ceeded to sell short shares of CompuDyne in both accounts, making substantial
25. Id.
26. SEC v. Joseph J. Spiegel, Litigation Release No. 19956, 2007 SEC LEXIS 7 (Jan. 4, 2007), available at
http://sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr19956.htm.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. SEC v. Hilary L. Shane, Litigation Release No. 19227, 2005 SEC LEXIS 1158 (May 18, 2005), availa-
ble at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19227.htm [hereinafter Shane Litigation Release]; see
also In re Hilary L. Shane, Exchange Act Release No. 51839, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2395,
2005 SEC LEXIS 1390 (June 14, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-51839.pdf
[hereinafter Shane Exchange Act Release].
33. See Shane Exchange Act Release, 2005 SEC LEXIS 1390.
34. Shane Litigation Release, 2005 SEC LEXIS 1158, at *2–3.
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profits.35  By short selling CompuDyne securities before the effective date of the
resale registration statement and then covering her short sales with the PIPE
shares after the resale registration statement became effective, Shane allegedly
engaged in insider trading and sold the shares prior to their registration in viola-
tion of Section 5 of the Securities Act.36  Shane consented to paying disgorgement
and civil penalties of $1 million, a permanent bar from association with any
broker-dealer, and a twelve-month suspension from association with any invest-
ment adviser.37
C. Violations of Rule 105 of Regulation M under the Exchange
Act
The SEC has brought many cases involving scenarios in which a trader
shorts a stock during the five-day “restricted period” before the pricing of a fol-
low-on offering, buys into the offering, and then uses the offering stock to cover
the short.38  This can prove profitable as the price of the stock drops through the
restricted period and the trader acquires the offering stock at a discount from the
price at which he shorted.  This trading sequence violates Rule 105 of Regulation
M under the Exchange Act.39  For years, Rule 105 generally has prohibited the
use of stock acquired from an underwriter in a follow-on offering to cover short
sales effected in the same stock during the five-day restricted period.  “The Com-
mission has long been concerned that short sales effected prior to certain offerings
that are covered with offering securities can be manipulative conduct harmful to
the market and can have a substantial impact on issuers or selling security hold-
ers.”40  Under a new amendment to Rule 105, investors shorting a stock during
the five-day restricted period preceding a follow-on offering by the issuer may
not acquire stock from an underwriter in that follow-on offering at all, except
under limited circumstances.41
35. Id. at *3.
36. Id.
37. Id. at *1–2; see also Shane Exchange Act Release, 2005 SEC LEXIS 1390, at *5.
38. Short Selling in Connection with a Public Offering, Exchange Act Release No. 54888, 71 Fed. Reg.
75002, 75004 (Dec. 13, 2006) (proposed Dec. 6, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242).  The SEC
noted:
The first time an issuer conducts a public offering of its securities, the offering is referred to
as an initial public offering (“IPO”).  Subsequent offerings by the issuer are referred to as
follow-on offerings or repeat offerings.  A secondary offering is an offering of securities held
by security holders, for which there already exist trading markets for the same class of
securities as those being offered.
Id. at 75003 n.12.
39. 17 C.F.R. § 242.105 (2007).
40. Short Selling in Connection with a Public Offering, 71 Fed. Reg. at 75003.
41. 17 C.F.R. § 242.105; Short Selling in Connection with a Public Offering, Exchange Act Release No.
56206, 73 Fed. Reg. 45,094 (Aug. 10, 2007).
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The SEC has charged several hedge funds with violating Rule 105.  In
October 2007, for example, the SEC brought a case against Colonial Investment
Management LLC, Colonial Fund LLC and Cary G. Brody, alleging that the
defendants realized $1.48 million in ill-gotten gains by violating Rule 105 in
connection with eighteen public offerings.42  The SEC alleged that in ten of those
trades, Colonial engaged in conduct calculated to conceal the use of the offering
stock to cover the short sales.43  After receiving the offering stock and using it to
cover its short positions, Colonial bought and sold stock in the same company
through open market purchases, directing the executive broker to purchase and
sell the same number of shares it was short at the same price.44  The SEC’s com-
plaint alleged that the open market purchases and sales were essentially shams,
and that the fund used the offering shares as the actual covers.45  The complaint
sought full disgorgement and prejudgment interest from all three defendants and
a civil penalty from Brody.46
In June 2007, the SEC brought a sizeable Rule 105 case against British
hedge fund manager GLG Partners, LP, an adviser for thirty hedge funds with
aggregate assets of over $12 billion.47  In an administrative proceeding, the SEC
found that GLG Partners had violated Rule 105 between 2003 and 2005 in
connection with fourteen offerings through trades involving four of GLG Part-
ners’ funds.48  In settling the SEC’s charges, GLG Partners agreed to disgorge
approximately $2.2 million in allegedly ill-gotten gains, pay a $500,000 civil
penalty, and implement policies and procedures specifically to prevent violations
of Rule 105.49
In March 2007, the SEC charged Imperium Advisors, LLC, a hedge fund
adviser, with violating Rule 105.50  The conduct, according to the SEC’s admin-
istrative order, was straightforward in that there were no allegations of open
market purchases, but instead simple allegations that the fund used offering stock
to cover the restricted period short sales.51  The fund settled for a cease-and-desist
42. SEC v. Colonial Inv. Mgmt. LLC, Litigation Release No. 20332, 2007 SEC LEXIS 2428 (Oct. 15,
2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20332.htm; Complaint at 7–15,
SEC v. Colonial Inv. Mgmt. LLC, No. 07 Civ. 8849 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2007).
43. Complaint at 10–15, SEC v. Colonial Inv. Mgmt. LLC, No. 07 Civ. 8849 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2007).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Colonial Inv. Mgmt., 2007 SEC LEXIS 2428.
47. In re GLG Partners, LP, Exchange Act Release No. 55956, 2007 SEC LEXIS 1372 (June 26, 2007),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2007/34-55956.pdf.
48. Id. at *2–3.
49. Id. at *8–9.
50. In re Imperium Advisors, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 55483A, Investment Advisers Act Release No.
2597A, 2007 SEC LEXIS 504 (Mar. 15, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2007/
34-55483a.pdf.
51. Id. at *2.
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order, agreed to disgorge $75,192 plus prejudgment interest of $7,176, and
agreed to pay a civil penalty of $37,596—equivalent to one-half of the disgorge-
ment sum.52
D. Other Short Sale Cases
The Commission generally is concerned where short selling can serve as a
tool for manipulating the price of a stock.  For example, in April 2006, the Com-
mission alleged that six individuals acting for an unregistered investment ad-
viser, Rhino Advisors, Inc., engaged in manipulative short selling of Sedona
Corporation stock.53  The SEC alleged that the defendants “used short selling to
manipulate Sedona’s stock price downward to enhance a client’s economic interest
in an agreement with Sedona.”54  Specifically, the complaint stated that the client
entered into an agreement with Sedona pursuant to which the client loaned
Sedona $2.5 million in exchange for Sedona’s pledge to pay the client $3 million
several months later.55  The client was to convert Sedona’s debt into Sedona com-
mon stock at a discount based on Sedona’s stock price.56  The lower Sedona’s stock
price, the more the client would benefit.57 The client’s agreement with Sedona
specifically precluded the client from short selling Sedona’s stock.58  The Commis-
sion’s complaint alleged that the traders nevertheless sold short Sedona’s stock on
behalf of the client, sending Sedona’s stock price down and ultimately benefiting
the client.59
E. Information Barriers and Trading Restrictions
Related to insider trading are cases involving information barriers.  Bro-
ker-dealers set up information barriers between different business units and em-
ployees generally because they are required to have policies and procedures in
place to prevent the dissemination of material nonpublic information under Ex-
change Act Section 15(f).60  Other financial institutions might establish informa-
tion barriers to avoid insider trading exposure when one unit of the firm
legitimately receives material nonpublic information about a particular issuer
under a duty of confidentiality, and another unit of the firm wants to trade in the
52. Id. at *8.
53. SEC v. Badian, Litigation Release No. 19639, 2006 SEC LEXIS 757 (Apr. 4, 2006), available at http://
www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2006/lr19639.htm; Complaint, SEC v. Badian, No. 06 Civ. 2621
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2006).
54. Id. at *1.
55. Complaint at 1–2, SEC v. Badian, No. 06 Civ. 2621 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2006).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at ¶ 2.
60. 15 U.S.C. §78o(f) (2000).
607
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\52-4\NLR404.txt unknown Seq: 12 17-APR-08 12:18
SEC ENFORCEMENT AND EXAMINATIONS CONCERNING HEDGE FUNDS
securities of the same issuer.  SEC Rule 10b5-161 creates a defense for entities to
insider trading liability when effective information barriers exist and the indi-
viduals who trade are not aware of the material nonpublic information held by
others at the firm.  Depending on the particular circumstances, information bar-
riers might be a solution for hedge fund advisers when, for example:
• One fund in a hedge fund complex invests in distressed debt and
finds itself on creditors committees or otherwise obtains material
nonpublic information about issuers, but other funds in the same
complex desire to continue trading securities in the same issuers.
• Designated personnel within a hedge fund complex receive solicita-
tions to invest in PIPE transactions and agree to keep the fact of
the potential PIPE confidential, but certain funds in the complex
own the stock and seek to avoid trading restrictions.
Although the SEC does not yet appear to have brought a case against a
hedge fund specifically involving inadequate information barriers, it recently has
brought cases against broker-dealers concerning information barriers.  A Novem-
ber 2005 SEC enforcement action, In re Van D. Greenfield, illustrates the type
of information barrier issues that might arise with hedge fund advisers.62  In
that case, the SEC brought a settled enforcement action charging a broker-dealer,
Blue River Capital LLC, and its principal, Greenfield, with lacking adequate
procedures to prevent the dissemination of material nonpublic information in
violation of Exchange Act Section 15(f).63  Blue River served as a member of
either the creditors committee or the equity securities committee in the bankrupt-
cies of public issuers including Globalstar, Adelphia, and WorldCom.64  Through
its membership on these committees, Blue River came into possession of material
nonpublic information that it had a duty to keep confidential.65
The Commission perceived several information barrier deficiencies.  First, it
considered the barriers porous: Although Greenfield handed over trading in these
stocks to another Blue River staff member, Greenfield continued to ask trading
room staff about Adelphia and WorldCom, to discuss Globalstar with a securities
analyst that covered the stock, and to receive “daily Blue River profit and loss
reports . . . that reflected Blue River’s trading activity in Globalstar, Adelphia,
and WorldCom securities.”66  Second, Blue River lacked written guidelines or
procedures to prevent the misuse by Blue River of material nonpublic informa-
61. 17 C.F.R. §240.10b5-1 (2007).
62. In re Van D. Greenfield, Exchange Act Release No. 52744, 2005 SEC LEXIS 2892 (Nov. 7, 2005),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-52744.pdf.
63. Id.
64. Id. at *3–5.
65. Id. at *6.
66. Id. at *8–10.
608
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\52-4\NLR404.txt unknown Seq: 13 17-APR-08 12:18
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 52  2007/08
tion obtained by Greenfield and did not restrict Blue River’s trading in Adelphia,
WorldCom, and Globalstar.67  Finally, there was no surveillance:  No one at Blue
River “monitored for compliance purposes any aspect of Blue River’s trading” in
Adelphia, WorldCom, and Globalstar.68
Where an information barrier might not work, and certain funds in a com-
plex have material nonpublic information about an issuer, placing the stock on a
restricted list often becomes the appropriate solution.  Here, too, the SEC does not
appear to have brought cases directly against hedge funds specifically for failures
in establishing or policing restricted lists.  But, the SEC has brought cases against
broker-dealers involving those issues.  In In re Morgan Stanley & Co., the
existence of computer glitches allegedly meant that there was no surveillance con-
cerning watch list securities by certain accounts for several years.69  Morgan
Stanley settled an administrative proceeding by agreeing, among other things, to
pay a $10 million civil penalty and to cease-and-desist from further violations of
Exchange Act Section 15(f).70
F. Late Trading and Market Timing Cases Involving Hedge Funds
As in prior years, 2007 saw a significant number of late trading and market
timing cases involving hedge funds.  The U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania brought the first criminal case against a hedge fund for decep-
tive market timing in charging Beacon Rock Capital, LLC.71  The information
charged that Thomas Gerbasio, a registered representative of two broker-dealers,
helped Beacon Rock conceal its identity and the nature of its trades in order to
engage in market timing trades and circumvent controls implemented by mutual
funds seeking to restrict market timing or other excessive trading.72  The SEC
filed a parallel civil injunctive action, alleging the following techniques to evade
mutual fund restrictions on market timing: “misrepresenting the nature of their
trades to the funds, opening dozens of accounts under different names to conceal
the customers’ identities from the funds, entering trades in amounts designed to
avoid the funds’ detection triggers, [and] trading in funds where management
was less likely to detect market timing.”73  Gerbasio settled the SEC action by
67. Id. at *10.
68. Id.
69. In re Morgan Stanley & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 54047, Investment Advisers Act Release No.
2526, 2006 SEC LEXIS 1465 (June 27, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2006/
34-54047.pdf.
70. Id.; see also SEC v. Barclays Bank PLC, Litigation Release No. 20132, 2007 SEC LEXIS 1170 (May
30, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20132.htm (concerning informa-
tion barriers and restricted lists by broker-dealers).
71. U.S. v. Beacon Rock Capital, LLC, Litigation Release No. 20051, 2007 SEC LEXIS 552 (Mar. 22,
2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20051.htm.
72.  Id.
73. Id. at *3.
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consenting to an injunction against violating Exchange Act Section 10(b) and
agreeing to pay $540,044 in disgorgement and prejudgment interest, later
waived down to $100,000.74  The court did not impose a civil penalty, based on
Gerbasio’s sworn financial statements to the Commission that he lacked the fi-
nancial resources to pay.75  In a follow-on administrative proceeding, the Com-
mission barred Gerbasio from association with broker-dealers.76  In the criminal
matter, Beacon Rock entered a guilty plea.77
In SEC v. Fife, the SEC charged a hedge fund adviser, Clarion Manage-
ment, and its principal, John Fife, with engaging in market timing by purchas-
ing variable annuity contracts and by “using trusts and limited liability
companies as nominee contract owners and beneficiaries to conceal Clarion Capi-
tal’s financial interest in the variable annuity contracts.”78  The complaint
charged Fife and Clarion with violating Exchange Act Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5, and Fife with control person liability under Exchange Act Section 20(a).79
In the last several years, the SEC has brought important enforcement ac-
tions against hedge funds or their personnel regarding market timing or late
trading.  In December 2005, the SEC brought an administrative proceeding
against Veras Capital Master Fund, VEY Partners Master Fund, Veras Invest-
ment Partners, LLC, Kevin D. Larson, and James R. McBride (the “Veras Re-
spondents”) for late trading and market timing.80  The settlement required that
the respondents pay over $35 million in disgorgement and $750,000 in penalties,
and imposed eighteen-month industry bars for each of the individuals.81  The
Commission found that Veras used several manipulative devices in order to en-
gage in market timing and late trading while avoiding detection.82  The Com-
74. Id. at *3–4.
75. See id. at *4.
76. Id.
77. See  Christine Caulfield, Hedge Fund to Plead Guilty to Market Timing, SEC. L. 360, Mar. 28, 2007.
78. SEC v. Fife, Litigation Release No. 19972, 2007 SEC LEXIS 107 (Jan. 19, 2007), available at http://
www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr19972.htm.
79. Id.
80. In re Veras Capital Master Fund, Securities Act Release No. 8646, Exchange Act Release No. 53011,
Investment Company Act Release No. 27197, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2466, 2005 SEC
LEXIS 3290 (Dec. 22, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-8646.pdf.
81. Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Veras Capital Master Fund, VEY Partners Master Fund, Veras In-
vestment Partners, LLC, Kevin D. Larson, and James R. McBride in Fraudulent Market Timing and
Late Trading Scheme (Dec. 22, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-182.htm.
82. Veras Capital Master Fund, 2005 SEC LEXIS 3290, at ¶¶ 11–12.
One such deceptive technique was the creation of legal entities with names unrelated to
‘Veras.’. . .  During the relevant time, Respondents used these entities to open multiple
accounts at multiple broker dealers. Respondents traded through these accounts to, among
other things, evade the restrictions imposed by the mutual funds on trading. Respondents
also used the multiple accounts to divide trades into smaller dollar amounts that would
more likely evade detection by the mutual funds.
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mission’s order noted that the Veras Respondents also engaged in late trading by
trading mutual fund shares after 4:00 p.m. eastern time and receiving the same
day’s price.83  The Commission found that the Veras Respondents violated, and
willfully aided and abetted others’ violations of, the antifraud provisions of the
federal securities laws, and willfully aided and abetted violations under the In-
vestment Company Act of 1940.84  In addition to disgorgement and penalties, the
Veras Respondents consented to the entry of a fraud cease-and-desist order and
are required to continue cooperating with the Commission.85
The SEC has brought numerous enforcement actions against mutual funds
for allowing hedge funds or their personnel to engage in market timing or late
trading.  For example, in October 2004, the SEC filed an administrative pro-
ceeding against Invesco Funds Group, Inc. (“IFG”), AIM Advisors, Inc., and
AIM Distributors, Inc., for allowing certain customers—some of whom were
hedge funds, including Canary Capital Partners LLC—to engage in market
timing in Invesco Funds advised by IFG and AIM Mutual Funds advised by
AIM Advisors.86  The SEC alleged that “IFG entered into negotiated, but undis-
closed, market timing agreements with over 40 individuals and entities . . .
which allowed them to ‘market time’ certain Invesco Funds, while representing
to other shareholders that it did not permit frequent trading in those funds,” and
in addition allowed market timing by other shareholders with whom it did not
have such agreements.87  IFG was alleged to have benefited by realizing in-
creased advisory fees as a result of the market timing, a failure to disclose a
conflict of interest based on the market timing, which the SEC described as “det-
rimental” to the Invesco Funds, and a resulting fiduciary duty to the Invesco
Funds and public shareholders of the mutual funds.88  Similarly, the SEC alleged
that AIM advisers entered into market timing agreements with ten individual
entities, resulting in higher fees, giving rise to potential conflicts of interest and a
breach in fiduciary duty to the AIM Funds and shareholders.89  AIM Advisors
and AIM Distributors were ordered to disgorge $20 million, AIM Advisors was
ordered to pay a civil penalty of $25 million, and AIM Distributors was ordered
Id.
83. Id. at ¶¶ 15–16.
84. Id. at ¶¶ 18–20.
85. Id. § IV.A.
86. In re Invesco Funds Group, Exchange Act Release No. 50506, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2311,
Investment Company Act Release No. 26629, 2004 SEC LEXIS 2318 (Oct. 8, 2004), available at http://
www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-50506.htm.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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to pay a civil penalty of $5 million; IFG was ordered to pay disgorgement of
$215 million and a civil penalty of $110 million.90
G. Conflict of Interest Cases
Some SEC enforcement matters involve allegations that hedge fund advis-
ers, due to conflicts of interest, have disadvantaged investment advisory clients.
In an administrative proceeding, the Division of Enforcement charged that, from
2001 through 2003, George Motz, the president and chief executive officer
(“CEO”) of Melhado, Flynn & Associates, Inc. (“MFA”), “engaged in fraudulent
trade allocation—‘cherry-picking’—at MFA,” an investment adviser and regis-
tered broker-dealer.91  “Motz unfairly allocated trades that had appreciated in
value during the course of the day to MFA’s proprietary trading account and
allocated purchases that had depreciated in value during the day to the accounts
of his advisory clients.”92  Beginning in the summer of 2003, according to the
Order Instituting Proceedings (“OIP”),93 “Motz engaged in cherry-picking to
favor one of the firm’s advisory clients, a hedge fund affiliated with MFA, over
his other advisory clients.”94  “Motz accomplished this cherry-picking by purchas-
ing securities toward the beginning of the trading day but waiting until later in
the day—after he saw whether the securities appreciated in value—to allocate
the securities.”95  “[N]early every trade that Motz allocated to MFA’s proprietary
account during [the relevant] period had appreciated in value from the time it
was purchased earlier in the day” resulting in “a net gain of close to $1.4 mil-
lion.”96  According to the OIP, “[n]either MFA nor Motz disclosed to clients that
the firm was engaged in cherry-picking and that the firm would favor itself in
the allocation of appreciated securities.  Nor did MFA or Motz disclose to clients
that the firm engaged in cherry-picking to favor Third Millennium over other
90. Id.
91. In re Melhado, Flynn & Assocs., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 55356, Investment Advisers Act Release
No. 2593, 2007 SEC LEXIS 372 (Feb. 26, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/
2007/34-55356-o.pdf.
92. Id. at *1.
93. An OIP is an order issued by the Commission—generally after investigation and notice and opportunity
for hearing—that lays out the Commission’s findings and orders any respondent to cease and desist from
current and future violations of the same provision, rule, or regulation the respondent is charged with
violating.  The OIP may also require undertakings, such as undertakings to cooperate with Commission
staff in further investigation or to retain special consultants to monitor compliance or develop programs.
An OIP may also order civil money penalties to be paid to the Commission. See generally Securities Act
of 1933 § 8A, 15 U.S.C. 77h-1 (2006); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u–3,
78u(a)(3) (2006).
94. Melhado, Flynn & Assocs., 2007 SEC LEXIS 372, at *8.
95. Id. at *4.
96. Id. at *9.
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advisory clients.”97  The SEC further alleged that Motz and MFA falsified docu-
ments to conceal their activities from SEC examiners.98
H. Misappropriating Assets and Similar Misrepresentations
The SEC historically has filed cases involving misappropriation or other
conduct when hedge fund advisers allegedly victimized their advisory clients.
For example, in September 2005, in the wake of widespread media reports of
apparent fraud at a Connecticut-based hedge fund, the Commission alleged that
Samuel Israel III and Daniel E. Marino, managers of the Bayou Funds, de-
frauded investors by “grossly exaggerating the Funds’ performance to make it
appear that the Funds were profitable and attractive investments, when in fact,
the Funds had never posted a year-end profit.”99  The Commission’s complaint
further alleged that Bayou, Israel, and Marino had misappropriated millions of
dollars of investor funds and had mostly stopped trading for the Funds altogether,
but still sent periodic and financial statements to investors, indicating that their
strategy was profitable.100  In April 2006, Israel and Marino consented to per-
manent injunctions against future violations of Securities Act Section 17(a), Ex-
change Act Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and Advisers Act Sections 206(1) and
(2).101  The judgment allowed the SEC to continue to seek monetary remedies
against Israel and Marino.102  In related administrative proceedings, the Com-
mission barred Israel and Marino from association with broker-dealers and in-
vestment advisers.103
Just two weeks after filing the Bayou Management case, in October 2005,
the Commission filed an emergency civil action against John H. Whittier, Wood
River Capital Management, LLC, Wood River Associates, LLC, Wood River
Partners, LP, and Wood River Partners Offshore, Ltd., for purported violations
of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws.104  The Commission’s
complaint alleged that Whittier made “material misrepresentations in fund offer-
ing materials, in marketing materials and in discussions with numerous inves-
tors.”105  The Commission alleged that the defendants had promised investors
97. Id. at *8–9.
98. Id. at *2.
99. SEC v. Samuel Israel III, Litigation Release No. 19406, 2005 SEC LEXIS 2463 (Sept. 29, 2005),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19406.htm.
100. Id.
101. In re Samuel Israel III, Litigation Release No. 19692, Exchange Act Release No. 53775, 2006 SEC
LEXIS 1040 (May 9, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2006/lr19692.htm.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. SEC v. Wood River Capital Mgmt., LLC, Litigation Release No. 19428, 2005 SEC LEXIS 2647 (Oct.
13, 2005), available at http://sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19428.htm.
105. Complaint at 5, ¶ 15, SEC v. Wood River Capital Mgmt., No. 05-CIV-8713 (S.D.N.Y.  Oct. 13, 2005).
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that the Funds would be diversified and audited.106  In reality, the Funds were
never audited, and more than 65 percent of the Funds’ assets were invested in
one small-cap company, the value of which ultimately declined, exposing the
Funds to large losses.107  The defendants consented to preliminary injunctions
and asset freezes.108
In February 2006, the Commission filed an emergency action to “halt an
ongoing offering fraud involving the sale of investments in seven hedge funds” by
Kirk S. Wright and two investment advisers.109  The complaint alleged that over
the course of nine years, Wright raised at least $115 million from as many as five
hundred investors and provided investors with “quarterly statements that mis-
represented both the amount of assets in the respective funds and the rates of
return obtained by them.”110  On February 9, 2007, the court entered a default
judgment enjoining Wright from future violations of Sections 17(a) of the Securi-
ties Act and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, and
from future violations of, or aiding and abetting violations of, Sections 206(1)
and 206(2) of the Advisers Act.111  “The court also ordered disgorgement against
Wright in the amount of $17,019,510 with prejudgment interest in the amount
of $2,786,399, and imposed a civil penalty of $120,000.”112  In March 2007, the
SEC instituted an administrative proceeding against Wright pursuant to Section
203(f) of the Advisers Act.113
Finally, in an administrative action instituted in March 2006, the SEC
Enforcement Division alleged that Rani T. Jarkas and Antoine K. Chaya, the
managers of Global Crown Capital, LLC of J&C Global Securities Investments,
LLC (“J&C”), exaggerated the Fund’s performance in order to conceal trading
losses from the Fund’s investors.114  The Division claimed that Jarkas and Chaya
sent misleading account statements to investors that falsely inflated the Fund’s
performance and understated the Fund’s losses by nearly 90 percent.115  The Di-
vision of Enforcement, however, moved to dismiss this action in October 2006
106. Wood River Capital Mgmt., 2005 SEC LEXIS 2647, at *1.
107. Id. at *1–2.
108. Id. at *3.
109. SEC v. Kirk S. Wright, Litigation Release No. 19581, 2006 SEC LEXIS 465, *1 (Feb. 28, 2006), availa-
ble at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19581.htm.
110. Id. at *1–2.
111. SEC v. Kirk S. Wright, Litigation Release No. 19999, 2007 SEC LEXIS 276 (Feb. 12, 2007), available
at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr19999.htm.
112. Id. at *1.
113. In re Kirk S. Wright, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2595, 2007 SEC LEXIS 422 (Mar. 2, 2007),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2007/ia-2595.pdf.
114. In re Global Crown Capital, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 53569, Investment Advisers Act Release
No. 2503, 2006 SEC LEXIS 733 (Mar. 30, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia-
2503-o.pdf.
115. Id.
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“in light of the potential impact of the recent decision by the District of Columbia
Circuit in Goldstein v. SEC, on the validity of claims against these Respon-
dents under Sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the Advisers Act.”116  The action was
dismissed on February 20, 2007.117
I. Cases Involving Broker-Dealers
The SEC and the self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”) have focused on
the role of broker-dealers as gatekeepers for their hedge fund clients.  In a March
2007 speech, Linda Chatman Thomsen said that broker-dealers that aid and abet
or cause violations have regulatory exposure, reasoning that by virtue of their
relationship with hedge funds, broker-dealers sometimes have a window into
misconduct by those customers.118  Thomsen queried whether broker-dealers
would allow certain customer conduct if those customers were not so lucrative for
them, and cautioned broker-dealers that they should apply to institutional cus-
tomers the same standards they apply to retail customers when deciding whether
to report violations.119
In a recent civil action, Zurich Capital Management (“ZCM”) settled for
over $16 million in disgorgement and penalties after being charged with aiding
and abetting four hedge funds in alleged market timing schemes.120  ZCM alleg-
edly provided the hedge funds with the financing needed to execute their transac-
tions despite knowing they were engaged in market timing tactics.121  In
addition to financing their actions, ZCM further facilitated the schemes by set-
ting up anonymous special purpose vehicles, which effectively allowed the funds
to mask their identities as they executed the prohibited trades.122
In March 2007, the SEC charged Goldman Sachs Execution and Clearing,
LP (“Goldman”) for allegedly allowing a customer improperly to mark orders
long when they were short, thereby violating Exchange Act Section 10(a) and
Rule 10a-1(d), when Goldman neither carried the securities in the relevant ac-
counts nor received assurances from the customer that it would deliver the securi-
ties.123  The trades took place through Goldman’s direct-access trading system.124
116. In re Global Crown Capital, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 55318, Investment Advisers Act Release
No. 2591, 2007 SEC LEXIS 335 (Feb. 20, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/
2007/34-56075.pdf.
117. Id.
118. See Remarks Before the IA Week, supra note 5.
119. Id.
120. In re Zurich Capital Mkts. Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 55711, Investment Company Act Release No.
27819, 2007 SEC LEXIS 943 (May 7, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2007/
34-55711.pdf.
121. Id. at *2.
122. Id. at *6.
123. In re Goldman Sachs Execution & Clearing, LP, Exchange Act Release No. 55465, 2007 SEC LEXIS
491 (Mar. 14, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2007/34-55465.pdf.
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The Commission found that Goldman possessed information suggesting that the
selling customers were misrepresenting their sales, including records revealing the
selling customers were repeatedly failing to deliver the securities that they pur-
ported to sell long, confirmations from the brokers from whom the selling custom-
ers had purchased cover stock indicating the purchases made were related to short
sales, and Clearance Activity Reports, Daily Margin Reports, and Daily Stock
Records showing that the selling customers held short positions in the offered
securities.125
J. Other Regulatory Actions
In addition to actions brought against hedge funds for alleged malfeasance
directly affecting the markets and/or investors, the SEC staff has targeted hedge
funds in various proceedings alleging failure to meet regulatory reporting and
other requirements.  For example, in August 2007, the staff settled with Quattro
Global Capital, LLC (“Quattro”), a registered investment adviser to a group of
hedge funds.126  Quattro had assets of approximately $900 million under man-
agement.127  “Section 13(f) of the Exchange Act and Rule 13f-1 thereunder re-
quire institutional investment managers who exercise investment discretion over
$100 million or more of Section 13(f) securities . . . to file Forms 13F quarterly
with the Commission” disclosing the Section 13(f) securities under the manager’s
discretion.128  The purpose of this requirement is to create a central repository of
the activities of investment managers to “facilitate consideration of the influence
and impact of institutional investment managers on the securities markets and
the public policy implications of that influence.”129  The staff alleged that Quattro
repeatedly and willfully failed to meet its statutory obligation to file Form 13F
reports over a period of more than three years.130  Quattro was ordered to cease
and desist such violations and to pay a civil money penalty of $100,000.131
This case is notable in light of recent attempts by hedge fund managers, who
tend to be notoriously secretive about their fund portfolios, to challenge the SEC’s
124. Id. at *2.
125. Id. at *9–12.
126. See In re Quattro Global Capital, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 56252, Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 2634, 2007 SEC LEXIS 1807 (Aug. 15, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
admin/2007/34-56252.pdf.
127. Id.
128. Id. at *2.  Generally, Section 13(f) securities are “exchange-traded equities (including certain convertible
debt securities) . . . .” Id.
129. Reporting by Institutional Investment Managers of Information With Respect To Accounts Over Which
Investment Discretion is Exercised, Exchange Act Release No. 13396, 1977 SEC LEXIS 2137, at *3–4
(Mar. 22, 1977).
130. Quattro Global Capital, 2007 SEC LEXIS 1946 at *8.
131.  Id. at *9.
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right to any information at all about their holdings.  On October 24, 2006, Phil-
lip Goldstein, the manager who successfully challenged the SEC’s hedge fund ad-
viser registration requirement, filed for exemption from the 13F filing
requirement, claiming that Rule 13f-1 violates the Fifth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution by allowing the SEC to take private property for public use “with-
out just compensation.”132  Goldstein also argued that Rule 13f-1 serves no legiti-
mate regulatory purpose and is, in fact, detrimental to hedge fund advisers, in
that forcing the adviser to publicly identify portfolio holdings is tantamount to
requiring the publication of trade secrets.133  As of the date of this article, no
official action has been taken on Goldstein’s application, and the Quattro action is
at least one indication that the SEC remains unsympathetic to Goldstein’s claims.
III. ISSUES RAISED DURING SEC EXAMINATIONS
SEC enforcement actions are one indicator of the SEC’s current priorities
regarding hedge funds.  While hedge fund advisers may or may not be registered
with the SEC,134 issues raised by regulators in the course of SEC examinations of
registered investment advisers also indicate important areas of focus for all hedge
fund advisers and compliance personnel.135  Understanding these issues, and de-
voting appropriate time and resources to addressing them, may prevent compli-
ance problems from developing into enforcement actions.136
132. In re Full Value Advisers, LLC, Application for an Order Pursuant to 13(f)(2) of the Exchange Act for
Exemption from Rule 13f-1 (Oct. 24, 2006), available at http://www.pomtalk.com/pomtalk/files/
request_for_exemption_from_rule_13f1.pdf.
133. Id.
134. All hedge fund advisers meet the definition of “investment adviser” under the Advisers Act and are there-
fore within the SEC’s enforcement jurisdiction.  Typically, however, a hedge fund adviser is not required
to register if it advises fewer than fifteen funds and other clients within a twelve month period (although
an adviser may elect to register for business or other reasons). See  Registration Under the Advisers Act of
Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2333 (Dec. 2, 2004) (to be codified
17 C.F.R. pt. 275, 278), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ia-2333.htm.
135. Much of the information set forth in Part III is based on the authors’ experience with adviser clients that
have undergone SEC examinations.  For publicly published information regarding the SEC examination
process, see, for example, SEC, EXAMINATION INFORMATION FOR BROKER-DEALERS, TRANSFER
AGENTS, CLEARING AGENCIES, INVESTMENT ADVISERS, AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES, available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/ocie_exambrochure.pdf [hereinafter EXAMINATION INFORMATION];
Lori A. Richards, Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, SEC, SEC’s Compliance
Examinations in the Protection of Investors, Remarks at the 9th Annual IA Compliance Best Practices
Summit 2007, IA Week and the Investment Adviser Association (Mar. 23, 2007), available at http://
www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch032307lar.htm [hereinafter SEC’s Compliance Examinations]; SEC,
QUESTIONS ADVISERS SHOULD ASK WHILE ESTABLISHING OR REVIEWING THEIR COMPLIANCE PRO-
GRAMS (2006), http://www.sec.gov/info/cco/adviser_compliance_questions.htm [hereinafter QUESTIONS
ADVISERS SHOULD ASK].
136. Since the adoption of Rule 206(4)-7, advisers have focused with increasing specificity on compliance issues
and problems, particularly as they relate to the adviser’s potential conflicts of interest.  In September 2007,
ACA Compliance Group, the Investment Adviser Association, IM Insight, and Old Mutual Asset Man-
agement issued a detailed report analyzing the results of their spring 2007 survey on investment manage-
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Registered hedge fund advisers are subject to routine periodic examinations
by the SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (“OCIE”) and
Division of Investment Management inspection programs.137  Since February
2004, all registered investment advisers are required by Rule 206(4)-7 under the
Advisers Act to designate a chief compliance officer (“CCO”) and to adopt a com-
prehensive compliance program that is reasonably designed to prevent, detect,
and correct violations of the federal securities laws.138  OCIE inspections involve
a top-to-bottom audit of advisers’ operations and compliance programs, and can
sometimes reveal deficiencies that might otherwise go undetected.  SEC officials
have repeatedly underscored the need for hedge fund advisers to assess potential
risks and conflicts of interest, and address them in written policies and procedures
that are tailored to the adviser’s business.139  The areas of recent SEC examina-
tion focus are detailed in the following subsections.
A. Conflicts and Risk Assessment
As a fundamental principle, SEC examiners look for a strong “culture of
compliance,” including an obvious “tone from the top.”140  CCOs must be suffi-
ciently empowered, experienced, competent, and compensated, and must have
sufficient and obvious access to the CEO, chief financial officer, and other critical
decision makers.141  In addition, SEC officials have stated that a compliance pro-
gram is by definition deficient if it does not start with a realistic, systematic, and
written assessment of conflicts and solutions.142  Examiners expect to see a com-
ment compliance testing practices.  The report summarized responses from more than 450 chief compliance
officers and other adviser compliance professionals and indicates how advisers have sought to comply with
the Commission’s compliance requirements under Rule 206(4)-7.  Specific areas of increasing focus include
personal trading, receipt and provision of gifts and entertainment, political and charitable contributions,
and insider trading. ACA COMPLIANCE GROUP ET AL., 2007 INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT COMPLI-
ANCE TESTING SURVEY (2007), available at http://www.investmentadviser.org/public/2007%20IM%20
Testing%20Report.pdf.
137. EXAMINATION INFORMATION supra note 135.
138. Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers, Investment Company Act Re-
lease No. 26299, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2204, 2003 SEC LEXIS 2980, *4–5 (Dec. 17,
2003) (rules became effective Feb. 5, 2004).
139. See , e.g., Gene Gohlke, Assoc. Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, SEC, Remarks
before the Fund of Funds Forum (Nov. 14, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
spch111405gag.htm [hereinafter Remarks before the Fund of Funds].
140. See , e.g. , SEC’s Compliance Examinations, supra note 135.
141. Gene Gohlke, Assoc. Dir, Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, SEC, Managed Funds
Association Educational Seminar Series 2005:  Practical Guidance for Hedge Fund CCOs Under the
SEC’s New Regulatory Framework (May 5, 2005), available at http://sec.gov/news/speech/spch050505
gg.htm (“[T]he compliance officer should have a position of sufficient seniority and authority within the
organization to be able to compel others to adhere to the firm’s compliance policies and procedures.”).
142. See generally QUESTIONS ADVISERS SHOULD ASK, supra note 135 (asserting that a “risk assessment”
analysis should be conducted during the initial establishment of the compliance program and periodically
thereafter).
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prehensive “risk map,” which identifies conflicts and other areas of challenge and
clearly discloses responsibilities and lines of reporting.143
B. Acquisition and Sharing of Information
1. Information Barriers
Hedge funds that engage in multiple strategies may find that certain indi-
viduals receive material nonpublic information in the context of one type of in-
vestment that would restrict the fund’s implementation of its strategy.  For
example, a portfolio manager for a fund that invests in corporate loans to dis-
tressed issuers may receive nonpublic information about the issuer in connection
with those loans.  Another portfolio manager may independently compile infor-
mation that supports an investment decision to short the equity of that issuer, but
once the adviser is in possession of material nonpublic information on the loan
side, investments in all of that issuer’s securities must be restricted unless the
adviser erects an information barrier or “ethical wall” to ensure that the invest-
ment decision is not made based on information that the equity portfolio manager
is not entitled to use.
A hedge fund adviser’s policies and procedures with respect to material non-
public information must be tailored to that adviser’s specific business and opera-
tions.144  People with access to material nonpublic information who are involved
in investment decision making must clearly be on one side of the wall or the
other—there can be no “straddling” of the wall.  Depending on the size of the
organization and the need to share information, effective information barriers
may be impractical.  SEC examiners will look for both the philosophical and
physical integrity of information barriers.145  Strict controls must be in place to
ensure that information does not “leak” through the wall via, for example, elec-
tronic systems or through conversations at lunch between analysts.
A related area of current SEC focus concerns the use of so-called “big boy”
letters.146  In a recent enforcement action, the SEC alleged that an adviser traded
in bonds while in possession of material nonpublic information it received while
sitting on creditors’ committees in the issuers’ bankruptcy cases.147  In several
instances, the adviser gave the counterparties to the trades big boy letters stating
that the adviser possessed material nonpublic information that it was not disclos-
143. SEC, Presentation at the 2007 CCOutreach Regional Seminars: SEC Examinations and the Risk Assess-
ment Process 12–13 (2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/info/cco/examprocess2007.pdf.
144. See QUESTIONS ADVISERS SHOULD ASK, supra note 135.
145. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
146. “Big boy” letters are used when one party to a transaction possesses nonpublic information that the other
party does not.  The letter makes clear that the parties understand the disparity in information and still
wish to enter into the transaction.
147. SEC v. Barclays Bank PLC, Litigation Release No. 20132, No. 07-CV-04427 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2007),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20132.htm.
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ing to the counterparties.148  It is important to note that the use of big boy letters
is not a defense in an insider trading case because the letters do not address the
breach of duty between the seller and the source of the information.  This action is
also notable because the SEC found that both senior management and compliance
personnel failed to prevent the illegal insider trading, despite receiving notice
that the proprietary desk had nonpublic information and should have been re-
stricted from trading.149  Not surprisingly, OCIE staff has begun including in-
quiries about the use of big boy letters in the context of adviser examinations.150
2. “Information Aggregators”
Many hedge fund advisers subscribe to the services of outside consultants, or
“consultant aggregators,” that provide access to experts in various industries.
These experts are not employees of the aggregator but instead are compensated by
the aggregator to discuss information with analysts and portfolio managers.
Regulators are interested particularly in situations in which the experts actually
are employees of public companies in which the buy-side entity has or might
invest.  They are interested in whether these scenarios present opportunities for
company insiders to convey material nonpublic information to buy-side analysts
and, accordingly, are interested in the adviser’s related policies and procedures
designed to prevent the misuse of such information.
Among the issues to be considered is whether recommendations based on
information collected from aggregators are permissible under the “mosaic the-
ory”—a method of analysis whereby an analyst gathers bits of public, nonpublic,
and nonmaterial information about a company, which in the aggregate, support
the analyst’s thesis about a company.151  In addition, because aggregators are
often compensated via soft dollars,152 questions arise regarding the appropriate
value of their services and the use of commission dollars to pay for those services.
3. Collaboration and Working in “Groups”
Examiners also have recently shown interest in how portfolio managers
share information and ideas with non-affiliated portfolio managers.153  The con-
cern appears to be that due to the size of the hedge fund industry in general and
the magnitude of assets controlled by certain funds in particular, hedge funds are
now in a position not only to control companies but to move markets—especially
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
151. MOSAIC THEORY, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/mosaictheory.asp (last
visited Jan. 17, 2008).
152. The term “soft dollars” refers to payments made for research and other related services via trading com-
missions. See infra Part III.C.3.
153. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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if two or more funds comprise a “group” working together to maximize return
with respect to a specific issuer or strategy.
In this regard, SEC examiners also look at sharing of client information for
confidentiality and material nonpublic information issues.154  Hedge fund advis-
ers who participate in “idea dinners”—informal gatherings with exclusive invi-
tation lists designed to foster the free exchange of investment ideas—are likely to
receive inquiries relating to the adviser’s monitoring of those events.
4. “Value Added” or “Strategic” Investors
Many hedge funds accept investors who potentially bring more to the poten-
tial success of the fund than their investment dollars alone.  Often these investors
are senior officers or directors at public companies or other issuers in which the
fund may invest.  Recently, SEC examiners have shown interest in these so-
called “value added investors,” looking carefully at how these investors “add
value” in light of inside information, material nonpublic information, confidenti-
ality, and allocation issues.155
C. Portfolio Management Issues
1. Personal Trading
Rule 204A-1 under the Advisers Act requires that all registered advisers
establish, maintain, and enforce a written code of ethics.156  The rule requires,
among other things, quarterly and annual reporting of personal securities hold-
ings and trading.157  On audit, SEC examiners scrutinize these reports, to both
ascertain compliance with the adviser’s policies and procedures and to assess
whether any personnel who has access to material nonpublic or trading informa-
tion has traded in contravention of the best interests of the adviser’s clients.158
Rule 204-2 under the Advisers Act also requires detailed books and records re-
garding the code, the persons required to comply with the code, and the history of
monitoring and enforcement of the code’s requirements.159
A pattern of failure to report timely or accurately, or failure to monitor
reporting, can have significant adverse regulatory consequences.  For example, in
April 2007, the SEC commenced an enforcement action against a mutual fund
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See Investment Advisers Code of Ethics, Investment Company Act Release No. 26492, Investment Ad-
visers Act Release No. 2256, 69 Fed. Reg. 41,696 (Jul. 9, 2004) (rule became effective Aug. 31, 2004).
157. Id.
158. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
159. Investment Advisers Code of Ethics, 69 Fed. Reg. 41,696. 
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portfolio manager, alleging antifraud and reporting violations resulting from
thousands of undisclosed personal stock trades.160
In a related vein, examiners will pursue arrangements in which an em-
ployee trades with a relative, a friend, or another person with whom that em-
ployee has other than a strictly business relationship.  Moreover, if a portfolio
manager trades with someone with whom he or she has a personal relationship,
and the CCO has not asked and does not know about the relationship, the exam-
iners will likely deem that arrangement to evidence a weakness in oversight and
require that the adviser rebut a presumption that the arrangement is
inappropriate.161
2. Best Execution
All hedge fund advisers have a fiduciary duty to seek best execution when
trading on behalf of their clients.162  “Best execution” is commonly understood to
require that the adviser obtain “the most favorable terms reasonably available
under the circumstances for customer transactions,”163 not necessarily that the ad-
viser obtain the lowest price, and the obligation applies to all types of securities
trading, including both equity and debt.
Among best execution failures cited by the SEC in recent years, “directed
brokerage” and “revenue sharing” arrangements have received particular atten-
tion.  Advisers who trade with brokers with whom they have quid pro quo ar-
rangements will be subject to intense regulatory scrutiny.  For example, in In re
Jamison, Eaton & Wood, Inc., the SEC alleged that an adviser traded with
brokers who referred clients to the adviser without (a) disclosing the potential
conflict of interest to the clients, (b) informing the clients that other full service
brokerage options were available at lower cost, and (c) seeking best net results for
its clients.164
In SEC examinations, examiners focus on all aspects of best execution, in-
cluding the broker-dealer selection process, the quality and speed of broker re-
sponsiveness, and the determination of fair commission or spread in the context of
160. In re Geoffrey Brod, Investment Company Act Release No. 27780, 2007 SEC LEXIS 715 (Apr. 9, 2007),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2007/ia-2600-o.pdf.  Mr. Brod has declined to settle
with the SEC and is instead pursuing a public hearing before an SEC administrative law judge.
161. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Andrew J. Donohue, Dir., Div. of Inv. Mgmt, SEC, Keynote Luncheon Address Before the
SIA Institutional Brokerage Conference (Oct. 30, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
2006/spch103006ajd.htm.
163. See, e.g., SEC, OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS AND EXAMINATIONS: EXAMINATIONS OF BRO-
KER-DEALERS OFFERING ONLINE TRADING: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2001),
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/online.htm [hereinafter EXAMINATIONS OF BROKER-DEALERS OFFER-
ING ONLINE TRADING].
164. In re Jamison, Eaton & Wood, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2129, 2003 SEC LEXIS 1174 (May
15, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia-2129.htm.
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each type of security traded, as well as other benefits.165  One-size-fits-all ap-
proaches to policies and procedures are generally frowned upon, as is less-than-
rigorous or absent monitoring of those procedures.  Examiners seek to determine
whether advisers are “periodically and systematically” assessing execution, and
the more complex a fund’s investment strategies are, the more detailed the process
is expected to be.166  In 2006, OCIE officials identified weaknesses in controls
and failure to adequately manage, identify, and disclose conflicts in brokerage
arrangements as two of the top five deficiencies found in SEC adviser
examinations.167
3. Soft Dollars
Section 28(e) of the Exchange Act provides a non-exclusive “safe harbor” to
advisers for payments made for research and other related services via trading
commissions.168  The Section 28(e) safe harbor, which often results in an adviser
paying more than the price of execution in exchange for qualifying research ser-
vices, has been the subject of controversy virtually since its enactment.  Because
commissions are client assets, advisers have a fiduciary responsibility to use them
responsibly, to disclose fairly how they will be used, and to use them in the ulti-
mate best interest of the clients.  In July 2006, the SEC issued an interpretive
release that clarified certain issues relating to, among other things, the proper use
of soft dollars and the types of services that would qualify for the safe harbor, but
the dialog and debate over the use of soft dollars continues.169
At the SIFMA March 2007 Law and Compliance Conference, James Shor-
ris, then head of enforcement for NASD, discussed concerns about soft dollar is-
sues such as broker-dealers paying for parking tickets, credit card bills, and home
theaters for hedge funds staff.170  SEC Enforcement Director Thomsen said the
SEC was looking at so-called “hedge fund hotels,” or office space given to hedge
funds by broker-dealers in return for brokerage business.171  Examiners are also
165. Id. at *15; see also EXAMINATIONS OF BROKER-DEALERS OFFERING ONLINE TRADING, supra note
163, § III.
166. Jamison, Eaton & Wood, 2003 SEC, LEXIS 1174, at *7.
167. See Highlights from “SEC Speaks” 2006, supra note 3.
168. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e) (2000).
169. Commission Guidelines Regarding Client Commission Practices Under Section 28(e) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 54165, 71 Fed. Reg. 41978 (July 24, 2006) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 241).
170. See SIFMA 2007 Conference—Remarks from Regulators, SEC. L. UPDATE (Sidley Austin LLP,
New York, N.Y.) (Apr. 9, 2007) [hereinafter SIFMA 2007 Conference].  In July 2007, NASD and
NYSE Member Regulation consolidated to form FINRA. See FINRA, http://www.finra.org/About-
FINRA/CorporateInformation/index.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2008).
171. See SIFMA 2007 Conference, supra note 170.
623
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\52-4\NLR404.txt unknown Seq: 28 17-APR-08 12:18
SEC ENFORCEMENT AND EXAMINATIONS CONCERNING HEDGE FUNDS
looking at the adequacy of soft dollar disclosure.  In May 2007, Chairman Cox
called for the repeal or, at least, substantial revision of, Section 28(e).172
While the future regulation of soft dollars is uncertain, it is clear that ar-
rangements whereby advisers are perceived to “pay up” for research or other ser-
vices will continue to be scrutinized on SEC audit.  Best execution principles, as
well as questions regarding self-dealing and conflicts of interest, are carefully
considered when evaluating soft dollar arrangements. OCIE Associate Director
Gene Gohlke has indicated that SEC staff will require at a minimum that the
value of the services for which investors pay be reasonably related to what they
paid.173
4. Valuation
Accurate valuation of portfolio securities is critical for funds, both for pur-
poses of pricing fund shares and for purposes of calculating fees and performance.
There is no accepted concept of “conservative” pricing, particularly in the context
of funds whose shares or units are offered or redeemed periodically.174  Hedge
funds and other alternative investment vehicles are particularly difficult to price,
because they tend to focus on harder-to-value instruments like private place-
ments, securitized structures, distressed securities, and illiquid securities.  Main-
tenance of accurate and defensible pricing becomes even more important when an
adviser manages different types of vehicles side-by-side, such as hedge funds, mu-
tual funds, private equity, and/or separate accounts.  Volatile markets further
complicate valuation issues for hedge funds; many of the instruments in which
these funds invest do not have readily available market prices and therefore must
be “fair valued” according to principles that are constantly revisited.175  In any
event, valuation procedures must be fully disclosed, well understood, and consist-
ently applied.176
172. Letter from Christopher Cox, SEC Chairman, to Christopher Dodd, U.S. Senator (May 17, 2007) (copy
on file with author) (“I am concerned that this overly complicated provision of the law hurts investors and
U.S. capital markets by protecting arrangements that involve substantial conflicts of interest, may con-
tribute to higher brokerage costs, is difficult to administer, and may operate to impede the further develop-
ment of efficient markets for brokerage as well as certain advisory services.”).
173. Richard Hill, Disclosure: Gohlke Says OCIE Focusing On Disclosure of Soft Dollar Conflicts,
SEC. L. DAILY (BNA), Oct. 20, 2006.
174. See, e.g., Andrew J. Donohue, Dir., Div. of Investment Mgmt., SEC, Opening Remarks Before the
CCOutreach National Seminar (Nov. 14, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/
spch111407ajd.htm.
175. For example, in 2006, the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued Statement No. 157, Fair Value
Measurements (“FAS 157”). FAIR VALUE MEASUREMENTS, Summary of Statement No. 157 (Fin. Ac-
counting Standards Bd. 2006), available at http://72.3.243.42/st/summary/stsum157.shtml.  FAS 157
was designed to address the extent to which entities, including hedge funds, measure and provide informa-
tion to investors regarding “fair value” of portfolio investments.  Developments in 2007 surrounding the
valuation of certain mortgage-backed securities and related derivative products in which hedge funds
invest have further highlighted the application of FAS 157 to hedge funds.
176. See Donohue, supra note 174.
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5. Allocation
Equally important, and scrupulously scrutinized, are fund allocation proce-
dures.  On audit, SEC examiners seek to confirm that procedures governing allo-
cation of securities are designed to ensure that opportunities are fairly allocated
among all clients.177  There is no single acceptable or appropriate way to allo-
cate—depending on the instrument, advisers may choose to allocate pro rata, on a
rotation system, or by another method.  Whatever method is chosen, however, a
retrospective review should reflect equitable allocation across clients over time.
Examiners look for “silos”—individual portfolio managers or management teams
within advisers who do not share opportunities.178  Procedures should seek equi-
table allocation both within a silo and across silos.
D. Other Areas of SEC Exam Focus
1. Books and Records
Although the SEC staff has indicated that it will no longer seek routine
review of email correspondence, the staff retains the right to ask for emails from
particular individuals or with respect to particular issues in which the staff
might be interested.179  Moreover, OCIE staff has indicated that advisers who
systematically delete emails will be asked to justify the system of deletion—for
example, how does the adviser know that the deleted email did not contain a
required book or record?180  Given the difficulty in proving this negative, many
advisers elect to retain everything, which results in a costly and cumbersome stor-
age, cataloging, and retrieval problem.
In 2006, OCIE staff indicated that guidance would be forthcoming regard-
ing the staff’s position on email retention.181  More recently, however, Andrew
“Buddy” Donohue, director of the SEC’s Division of Investment Management,
has indicated that email retention, review, and production regulations will be
considered in connection with a comprehensive review and rethinking by the
SEC staff of the adviser books and records rules.182  As of the end of 2007, how-
ever, no additional SEC guidance was forthcoming.
177. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
178. Id.
179. ACA Compliance Group, New OCIE Policy: No Initial E-Mail Requests in Routine Exams, IM
INSIGHT, Nov. 21, 2005 (copy on file with author).
180. See, e.g., Lori A. Richards, Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, SEC, Remarks
Before the Greater Cincinnati Mutual Fund Association Directors’ Workshop (Sept. 22, 2005), available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch092205lr.htm.
181. Paul S. Watkins, Commissioner, SEC, Remarks Before the IA Compliance Best Practices Summit 2006
(Feb. 28, 2006), available at http://sec.gov/news/speech/spch022806psa.htm.
182. Andrew Donohue, Dir., Div. of Investment Management, SEC, Remarks Before the IA Week and the
Investment Adviser Association 9th Annual IA Compliance Best Practices Summit 2007 (Mar. 22, 2007),
available at http://sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch032207ajd.htm.
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2. Side Letters
Examiners are looking at special relationships with investors in general and
side letters in particular.  Side letters evidence special arrangements with certain
clients.  Susan Ferris Wyderko, the former acting director of the SEC’s Division
of Investment Management, highlighted two main SEC concerns with respect to
side letters: (a) terms that may benefit one investor at the expense of others, and
(b) the adequacy of disclosure to other investors.183  Certain terms that do not
affect a fund’s portfolio or raise liquidity concerns are unlikely to harm investors
in the fund generally, and, if properly disclosed, are unlikely to be deemed a
violation of the adviser’s fiduciary duty.  These “low risk” terms include “most
favored nation” clauses,184 favorable fee arrangements, or the right to transfer to
an affiliate or to determine form of redemption payment.  “Higher risk” side let-
ters—terms that raise fiduciary issues that cannot necessarily be cured by disclo-
sure—include preferential liquidity terms, preferential access to portfolio
information, advance notice of redemptions, and guaranteed access to fund
capacity.185
3. Funds of Funds
Funds of funds raise unique issues for SEC examiners.  For example, to
what extent is the “top” fund responsible for evaluating the compliance and regu-
latory policies and procedures of the underlying funds?  Should the due diligence
process contemplate review of pricing and valuation, performance calculation, or
allocation?  Is there a specifically articulated due diligence protocol, and how is
consistency and compliance with that protocol monitored and enforced?186  In ad-
dition, recent developments that complicate hedge fund valuation generally raise
new challenges for funds of funds in particular.187
183. Role of Hedge Funds in Our Capital Markets: Hearing Before the S. Subcommittee on Securities
and Investment, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Susan Ferris Wyderko, Acting Director, Division of
Investment Management, SEC), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ts051606sfw.htm.
184. A “most favored nation” clause provides that the recipient of the most favored nation status will always be
treated at least as favorably as any other client.
185. The U.K. Financial Services Authority (“FSA”) also is scrutinizing side letters, expressing concern in a
recent statement that the undisclosed use of side letters may result in “some, often large, investors receiving
more information and preferential (early) redemption terms compared with other investors in the same
share class . . . . ” FSA, HEDGE FUNDS: A DISCUSSION OF RISK AND REGULATORY ENGAGEMENT,
FEEDBACK ON DP05/4 6 (Mar. 2006), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/fs06_02.pdf.
The FSA stated that it expects “managers to ensure that all investors are informed when a side letter is
granted and any conflicts that may arise are adequately managed.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
186. For a discussion of how an adviser to a fund of funds might go about establishing a compliance process for
valuing the fund’s assets, see Remarks before the Fund of Funds, supra note 139.
187. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.  Advisers to funds of funds that invest in underlying funds,
which themselves invest in volatile, fair valued securities may find valuation more challenging than
historically was the case.
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4. Performance Advertising
In addition to routine examinations conducted at individual advisers,
OCIE also conducts “sweep exams” that target specific issues within a cross-sec-
tion of advisers.188  During a recent risk-targeted sweep exam focusing on per-
formance advertising, SEC examiners identified a number of deficiencies.189  The
most common deficiencies involved disclosure issues, including: (a) failure to de-
duct advisory fees from performance results; (b) failure to disclose whether results
reflect reinvested dividends; (c) failure to disclose material facts regarding a par-
ticular index used to benchmark performance claims; and (d) inappropriate use of
past specific recommendations.190
Certain advisers lacked compliance policies and procedures governing mar-
keting and performance advertising, and others maintained procedures that, in
the staff’s view, did not appear to be effective.  For example, inadequate policies
and procedures did not:
[a] address the operations or practices of the adviser’s businesses; [b]
ensure that third-party consultants used compliant presentations; [c]
address the methods the adviser used to treat cash (and equivalents)
when ‘carving out’ separate equity and fixed income performance from
balanced accounts; [d] ensure compliance with all applicable require-
ments of the CFA Institute’s performance presentation standards (cur-
rently called “Global Investment Performance Standards” or “GIPS”)
prior to making a claim of such compliance; [e] require a consistent
comparison of composites to appropriate benchmarks; and [f] ensure ac-
curate composite descriptions.191
Some examples of policies and procedures in place at the firms
with fewer deficiencies included: [a] a multi-level review process
among the adviser’s employee groups that manage assets, calculate per-
formance and market fund shares for the accuracy of marketing materi-
als prior to their use; [b] the creation of “tolerance reports” on a monthly
basis to compare all composite accounts to their respective benchmarks,
with any material discrepancies subsequently investigated; [c] a com-
posite committee review of all accounts on at least a quarterly basis to
ensure proper composite construction and maintenance; and [d] the use
of a second independent pricing service to periodically verify the accu-
racy of prices.192
188. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
189. SEC, COMPLIANCEALERT: JUNE 2007 (2007), http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/complialert.htm.
[hereinafter COMPLIANCEALERT].
190. SEC, CCOUTREACH 2007 REGIONAL SEMINARS 11–12 (2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/info/
cco/information2007.pdf [hereinafter CCOUTREACH].
191. COMPLIANCEALERT, supra note 189.
192.  Id.
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5. Safeguarding Information
“Identity thieves appear to be directing increased attention to the securities
business, and their attacks are growing in sophistication,” warned OCIE Associ-
ate Director and Chief Counsel John H. Walsh in an October 2006 speech.193  In
response, OCIE has initiated a new sweep exam program, examining broker-
dealers’ and advisers’ policies and procedures for preventing identity theft.194  In
general examinations the SEC staff is also focusing heightened attention on a
firm’s “information security” or “safeguarding” controls for protecting client infor-
mation.195  OCIE Director Lori A. Richards has identified this area as associated
with a number of deficiencies found in 2006 exams and a compliance require-
ment to which advisers should be “particularly attuned.”196  Issues include pro-
tecting both electronic and paper-based information and controls over customers’
personal information, the creation and sending of account statements, and the
security of account and position valuations.197
The safeguarding portion of Regulation S-P, the SEC’s privacy regulation,
requires registered advisers to adopt written policies and procedures that address
the protection of customer information and records.
[These] policies and procedures must be reasonably designed to: (a)
[i]nsure the security and confidentiality of customer records and infor-
mation; (b) [p]rotect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the
security or integrity of customer records and information; and (c)
[p]rotect against unauthorized access to or use of customer records or
information that could result in substantial harm or inconvenience to
any customer.198
SEC staff review of an adviser’s safeguarding program may include, among
other things, evaluation of: (a) methods used to identify and assess the risks to
client information; (b) effectiveness of safeguards for controlling these risks (e.g.,
management and staffing, intrusion detection and response, data center physical
security, firewalls, laptop security); (c) the firm’s response to information breaches
and steps taken to prevent a recurrence; (d) the firm’s monitoring and testing of
its safeguarding program; (e) protection of proprietary portfolio management in-
formation, including monitoring of personal trading by persons who have access
193. John H. Walsh, Assoc. Dir., Chief Counsel, Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, Compli-
ance Professionals versus Identity Thieves, NRS 21st Annual Fall Compliance Conference (Oct. 5, 2006),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch100506jhw.htm.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Lori A. Richards, Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, SEC, The Process of Compli-
ance, speech before the National Membership Meeting of the National Society of Compliance Professionals
(Oct. 19, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch101906lar.htm.
197. Id.
198. 17 C.F.R. § 248.30 (2007).
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to material non-public information; and (f) whether policies and procedures are
designed to adequately address changes in the firm’s business or operations and
ongoing technological developments.199
6. Accuracy and Adequacy of Disclosure
Among the most frequently identified deficiencies in SEC examinations are
inaccurate or incomplete disclosures.200  As part of its fiduciary duty, an adviser
has an obligation of full and fair disclosure of all material facts to clients.  During
inspections, SEC examiners review an adviser’s filings with the SEC and mater-
ials provided to clients (including Form ADV Parts 1 and II, offering documents,
and advertisements) to ensure that the adviser’s disclosures are accurate, timely,
consistent, and do not omit material information.201  As OCIE Director Richards
noted, “[a]ny discrepancies between the written disclosure and actual practice, or
any inaccurate, incomplete, or untimely materials, indicate weak internal control
processes and will heighten scrutiny by examination staff.”202
Common examples of inaccurate or incomplete disclosures noted in recent
examinations include: (a) failure to disclose all material conflicts of interest that
surround and influence a firm’s business, including, for example, with respect to
investment decision-making and brokerage arrangements; (b) failure to ade-
quately disclose all industry activities and affiliations; and (c) use of soft dollars
that conflicts with disclosures to clients.203
The Commission voted unanimously in July 2007 to adopt a new “anti-
fraud rule” under the Advisers Act.204  New Rule 206(4)-8 makes it a fraudu-
lent, deceptive, or manipulative act for an investment adviser to a pooled invest-
ment vehicle (including a hedge fund) to make false or misleading statements
(including via omission of a material fact) to investors, prospective investors, or
prospective investors in that pool.205  In the proposing release, the SEC staff
noted that the rule will “prohibit, for example, materially false and misleading
statements regarding investment strategies [funds] will pursue (including strate-
gies the adviser may pursue for the [fund] in the future), the experience and
credentials of the adviser (or its associated persons), the risks associated with in-
199. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Lori A. Richards, Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, SEC, Compliance Issues for
Investment Advisers Today, Remarks at Investment Counsel Association/IA Week Investment Adviser
Compliance Summit (Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch042803lar.htm.
203. CCOUTREACH, supra note 190.
204. Press Release, SEC, SEC Votes to Adopt Antifraud Rule Under Investment Advisers Act (July 11, 2007),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-133.htm.
205. Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles, Investment Advisers Act Release
No. 2628, 2007 SEC LEXIS 1736 (Aug. 3, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275).
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vestment in [funds],” the performance of the fund or other funds advised by the
adviser, the valuation of the fund and “practices the adviser follows in the opera-
tion of its advisory business, such as how the adviser allocates investment
opportunities.”206
7. Contingency Planning
Among the components of a comprehensive adviser compliance program
often overlooked, the SEC staff has noted the absence of effective “contingency” or
“disaster recovery” procedures.207  In a 2007 letter, the staff noted “lessons
learned” collected from advisers that had been affected by Hurricane Katrina.208
Certain provisions in disaster recovery plans, said the staff, “appeared to be effec-
tive with respect to the adviser’s ability to provide uninterrupted advisory ser-
vices to clients in a compliant manner after a disaster.”209  Particular provisions
noted as effective included:
[a] a pre-arranged remote location . . .; [b] alternate communication
protocols to contact staff and clients, such as cell phones, text messaging,
web-based email accounts, or an internet website; [c] [appropriately
secure] remote access to business records and client data . . .; [d] tempo-
rary lodging for key staff . . .; [e] maintaining accurate and up-to-date
contact information for all third-party service providers . . .; [f] famili-
arity with the business continuity plans of such third-party service
providers; [g] contingency arrangements for loss of key personnel . . .;
[h] effective training of staff on how to fulfill essential duties in the
event of a disaster . . .; and [i] maintaining sufficient insurance and
financial liquidity to prevent any interruption to the performance of
compliant advisory services.210
IV. SEC ENFORCEMENT PROCESS
About two and a half years have passed since Christopher Cox took over as
chairman of the SEC.  When he became chairman, Cox pledged that enforcement
would be his top priority.211  At least three process-type trends have since
emerged concerning enforcement under Cox.  First, the Commission appears to be
206. Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles; Accredited Investors in Certain
Private Investment Vehicles, Securities Act Release No. 8766, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2576,
2006 SEC LEXIS 3157, at *21 (Dec. 27, 2006).
207. COMPLIANCEALERT, supra note 189.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Hearing on Pending Nominations Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
109th Cong. 12–14 (2005) (statement of  Rep. Christopher Cox, presidential nominee for chairman of the
SEC).
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showing greater oversight concerning the enforcement process; second, the SEC
appears to be bringing more cases based on old conduct; and, third, there appears
to be some disunity among the commissioners concerning certain important en-
forcement-related issues.
A. Commission Oversight
In a number of ways, the Commission appears to be demonstrating greater
oversight on the enforcement staff.  For example, in April 2007, SEC Chairman
Cox announced an important change to settlement procedures for SEC enforce-
ment actions.212  The change, applicable to select cases against public companies,
requires the SEC staff to obtain Commission approval before engaging in settle-
ment negotiations with prospective defendants or respondents.  The new policy
differs from the previous status quo, in which the SEC staff freely negotiated
settlements with prospective defendants and respondents without Commission
authority, reached an agreement in principle, and then presented the settlement
to the Commission for approval.
In 2006, the SEC announced a policy imposing greater commissioner super-
vision over SEC staff when it seeks to issue subpoenas to the media.213  Under
that new policy, the staff needs to obtain the approval of the SEC’s enforcement
director, and notify the chairman’s office, before issuing subpoenas to the press.214
Although the policy does not itself have a great impact on how the staff conducts
investigations, since the staff rarely issues subpoenas to the press, it evidences a
skepticism among some commissioners with the staff’s ability to exercise indepen-
dent judgment.
B. Age of Conduct
More SEC cases seem to be involving old conduct.  A March 2007 case, In
re Banc of America Securities LLC, involved research analyst issues from
1999 to 2001.215  Another case filed in May 2007, In re Motorola, Inc., in-
volved allegations that during 2000 to 2001 Motorola engaged in transactions
that enabled Adelphia Communications Corporation to commit accounting
fraud.216  These and other cases that involve conduct more than five years old
suggest a departure from the theme of “real time enforcement” that characterized
212. Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Address to the Mutual Fund Directors Forum Seventh Annual Policy
Conference (Apr. 13, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch041207cc.htm.
213. Press Release, SEC, Policy Statement of the SEC Concerning Subpoenas to Members of the News Media
(Apr. 12, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-55.htm.
214. Id.
215.  In re Banc of America Sec. LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 55466, 2007 SEC LEXIS 492 (Mar. 14,
2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2007/34-55466.pdf.
216.  In re Motorola, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 55725, 2007 SEC LEXIS 955 (May 8, 2007), available
at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2007/34-55725.pdf.
631
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\52-4\NLR404.txt unknown Seq: 36 17-APR-08 12:18
SEC ENFORCEMENT AND EXAMINATIONS CONCERNING HEDGE FUNDS
the Commission’s enforcement efforts during Harvey Pitt’s tenure as chairman
earlier in the decade.
C. Less Unity Among Commissioners than Meets the Eye?
The three Republicans and two Democrats that until recently comprised the
Commission split down ideological lines concerning a number of issues.  Enforce-
ment process issues are no different.  In January 2006, for example, the SEC
issued a statement explaining the criteria it would apply when assessing the need
for civil monetary penalties against public companies.217  In the Penalties State-
ment and Chairman Cox’s accompanying remarks, the Commission emphasized
that it was acting unanimously.  Chairman Cox, for example, stated how “[a]fter
much deliberation the Commission has reached unanimous agreement on guide-
lines that will inform our future actions.”218  He later stated that “[i]t is a source
of particular satisfaction to me that, through careful deliberation, our various
views were forged into a single general framework.”219  The Penalties State-
ment, however, never actually applied its penalties criteria to the facts of the two
particular enforcement matters that served as its catalyst, SEC v. McAfee,
Inc.220 and In re Applix, Inc.221  Instead, the Commission left that important
analysis to the SEC Enforcement Director Thomsen, who provided some expla-
nation in separate remarks and in the separate press release for McAfee .222
By contrast, the SEC’s 2001 Section 21(a) Report not only laid out general
factors that the Commission said it would consider when deciding whether and
how to take enforcement action against companies, but explained, under the par-
ticular facts at hand, exactly why it was not taking enforcement action in the
specific case before it.223  Quite possibly, the commissioners were less united in
their reasons for imposing a $50 million penalty in McAfee  and accepting no
penalty in Applix than they were in their support for the general framework.
217. Press Release, SEC, Statement of the SEC Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm.
218. Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Statement of Chairman Cox Concerning Objective Standards for Cor-
porate Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch010406cc.htm (empha-
sis added).
219. Id.
220. SEC v McAfee, Inc., SEC Litigation Release No. 19520, 2006 SEC LEXIS 2 (Jan. 4, 2006), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19520.htm.
221. In re Applix, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8651, Exchange Act Release No. 53049, 2006 SEC LEXIS 8
(Jan. 4, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-8651.pdf.
222. Linda Chatman Thomsen, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, SEC, Statement regarding McAfee, Inc. and Ap-
plix, Inc. (Jan. 4, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch010406lct.htm.
223. Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and Commission State-
ment on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act Release No.
44969, 2001 SEC LEXIS 2210 (Oct. 23, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/
34-44969.htm.
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For over a year after the Penalties Statement, the Commission reportedly was
deadlocked on how to apply civil penalties against public companies in options
backdating cases.
Similarly, the commissioners have shown disunity concerning the settlement
process for public companies announced in April 2007 and discussed above.
Shortly after Chairman Cox announced the new policy for requiring Commission
approval before the staff could negotiate settlements against public companies,
Commissioner Roel Campos publicly objected to it on grounds that it improperly
constrained the staff.224
What do these apparent changes mean for hedge funds?  First, greater Com-
mission supervision of the staff can mean longer investigations, even if the ulti-
mate result is for the SEC to close an investigation after developing a record that
misconduct did not occur.  Second, the trend toward “older” cases means that SEC
investigations are now more likely to focus on transactions and activities that
took place years ago.  Significantly, although certain statutes of limitation govern
particular types of remedies available to the SEC, there is no general statute of
limitation on SEC enforcement actions per se.  Nor is the equitable doctrine of
“laches” often available as an affirmative defense in SEC enforcement actions.
Finally, the apparent disunity among commissioners could help prospective de-
fendants, such as hedge funds, in matters involving novel factual or legal ques-
tions and conduct that is arguably defensible.  In garden variety cases presenting
straightforward legal questions, however, the Commission is far more likely to
unify and accept recommendations by the SEC staff.
V. CONCLUSION
Hedge funds likely will remain an important focus for the SEC during the
remainder of Chairman Cox’s tenure as chairman, and, quite possibly, well after
that.  What is more, regulatory interest is not likely to remain confined to the
SEC.  State regulators have indicated an interest in hedge funds.  The New York
attorney general has been investigating issues associated with “consultant aggre-
gators,” mentioned above.  The Massachusetts Securities Division, under the au-
thority of Secretary William Galvin, also has shown increasing interest in hedge
funds.  In January 2007, Galvin filed an administrative complaint against ac-
tivist hedge fund manager Phillip Goldstein for allegedly making an unregistered
securities offering of his fund in violation of the Massachusetts Uniform Securi-
ties Act.225  In June 2007, Galvin filed an administrative complaint alleging
that a hedge fund prime broker engaged in “dishonest and unethical practices” in
224. Jesse Westbrook, Campos Says SEC Fine Policy Raises ‘Grave Concerns,’ BLOOMBERG, Apr. 25,
2007.
225. Administrative Complaint, In re Bulldog Investors General Partnership, et al., No. E-07-0002 (Jan. 31,
2007), available at http://www.sec.state.ma.us/sct/sctbulldog/bulldogidx.htm.
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providing certain benefits, such as office space, to hedge fund advisers.226  Hedge
funds are well advised to take note of the many issues raised by the regulatory
enforcement actions and examiners, and to routinely examine their written poli-
cies and procedures in order to make sure those policies and procedures reflect the
current landscape.
226. Administrative Complaint, In re UBS Securities, LLC, No. E-2007-0049 (June 27, 2007), available at 
http://www.sec.state.ma.us/sct/sctubs/ubs_complaint.pdf.  For further information on NASD and NYSE
rules and proposals relating to gifts and entertainment, see Gift and Entertainment Developments,
MARKET REGULATION UPDATE (Sidley Austin LLP, N.Y., New York) (Dec. 2006), available at http://
www.sidley.com/db30/cgi-bin/pubs/MarketRegDec06.pdf; NYSE and NASD Proposes Address Busi-
ness Entertainment, MARKET REGULATION UPDATE (Sidley Austin LLP, New York, N.Y.) (Feb. 23,
2006), available at http://www.sidley.com/db30/cgi-bin/pubs/MarketRegFeb2306.pdf.
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